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I.

Introduction

After Russia’s thirteen vetoes and seven by China 2 to shield the
Syrian regime from any action, it seems reasonable to ask the question:
In light of the findings of several U.N. reports, as well as reports from
credible human rights organizations, that Syrian military and security
forces have continued to commit atrocity crimes ever since the onset of
the Syrian crisis, is it not prudent to explore the measures to protect
innocent men, women, and children from such flagrant violations of
human rights? Notwithstanding the threat or use of the veto, the

1.

Distinguished University Professor, University of Denver; Director of the
Ved Nanda Center for International and Comparative Law, University of
Denver Sturm College of Law; Honorary Professor, University of Delhi,
India, Faculty of Law.

2.

UN Security Council Working Methods: The Veto (Sept. 30, 2019),
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-workingmethods/the-veto.php [https://perma.cc/F6L3-LPX9] [hereafter Security
Council Veto]. Russia’s thirteenth veto and China’s seventh was cast on
September 19, 2019, on a draft resolution by Kuwait, Belgium, and
Germany seeking a truce in Northwest Syria. See Michelle Nichols,
Russia casts 13th veto of U.N. Security Council Action During Syrian
(Sept.
19,
2019),
War,
REUTERS
https://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCAKBN1W42CJ-OCATP
[https://perma.cc/4SZQ-2WRS].
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Uniting for Peace Resolution, 3 which I will discuss in this paper,
provides such means.
Protests in Syria began in the Spring of 2011, following the
uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, the so-called “Arab Spring.” 4 The U.N.
Human Rights Council established an Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 5 which found that
Syrian government forces and militias had committed gross human
rights violations that were widespread and systematic, amounting to
crimes against humanity, with the apparent knowledge and consent of
the highest-level officials of the Syrian government. 6 The Human Rights
Council reported on the Commission’s findings:
The substantial body of evidence gathered by the Commission
indicates that these gross violations of human rights have been
committed by Syrian military and security forces since the
beginning of the protests in March 2011. The Commission is
gravely concerned that crimes against humanity have been
committed in different locations in the Syrian Arab Republic
during the period under review. 7

Subsequently, in February 2012, the Commission submitted a
second report to the Human Rights Council stating that the Syrian
government had “manifestly failed in its responsibility to protect its
people. Since November 2011, its forces have committed more
widespread, systematic, and gross human rights violations.” 8 And
3.

See G.A. 5/377(V) (Nov. 3, 1950).

4.

See Joe Sterling, Daraa: The Spark that Lit the Syrian Flame, CNN (Mar.
1, 2012), https://www.cnn.com/2012/03/01/world/meast/syria-crisisbeginnings/index.html [https://perma.cc/73XS-QH2D].

5.

Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic: About the Commission of Inquiry, U.N. Hᴜᴍᴀɴ Rɪɢʜᴛs Cᴏᴜɴᴄɪʟ,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/AboutCo
I.aspx [https://perma.cc/U6NL-WASE].

6.

See id.

7.

U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/S17/2/Add.1,
summary
(Nov.
23,
2011),
available
at
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/SY/A.HRC.S17.2.Add.1_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6CU-MX3K].

8.

U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/19/69,
summary
(Feb.
22,
2012),
available
at
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSessi
on/Session19/A-HRC-19-69.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5TF4-CDXS].
Subsequently, in late May 2012, appalled at the indiscriminate and
possibly deliberate killing in the area of Homs in Syria, the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights said that “These acts may amount to
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seven years later, on January 31, 2019, the Commission reiterated its
earlier findings: “Attacks by pro-government forces in Idlib and western
Aleppo Governorates . . . continue to cause scores of civilian
casualties.” 9 It further stated that the human rights violations “and
general absence of the rule of law paint a stark reality for civilians
countrywide, including for 6.2 million internally displaced persons and
5.6 million refugees seeking to return.” 10 Human rights organizations,
including Human Rights Watch 11 and Amnesty International 12 provide
similar accounts of atrocity crimes committed by the Syrian
government forces.
Russia has cast thirteen vetoes, inter alia, to block draft resolutions
calling for a ceasefire in Syria’s Idlib province and to establish
investigations of chemical weapons use in Syria’s civil war, 13 calling for
crimes against humanity and other international crimes.” Statement by
Navi Pillay, High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Human Rights
Council 19th Special Session on “The deteriorating Human Rights
Situation in the Syrian Arab Republic and the Killings in El-Houleh”
(June
1,
2012),
available
at
https://newsarchive.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.asp
x?NewsID=12210&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/64GG-RZFW].
9.

U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/40/70,
Summary (Jan. 31, 2019), available at https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G19/023/20/PDF/G1902320.pdf?OpenEl
ement [https://perma.cc/8T88-X6AR].

10.

Id.

11.

Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) has issued several reports on the topic.
For the 2019 HRW Report on Syria, see World Report 2019: Syria, Hᴜᴍᴀɴ
Rɪɢʜᴛs
Wᴀᴛᴄʜ,
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/countrychapters/syria [https://perma.cc/9TTQ-DXCU].

12.

Since the beginning of the civil war in Syria, Amnesty International
(“AI”) has released several reports. In its August 2012 report, AI detailed
a wide range of state-directed, systematic violations of human rights,
including the deliberate targeting of peaceful protesters and injured
protesters, torture, targeting of medics providing emergency treatment for
the wounded, arbitrary arrests, and disappearances in Syria’s largest and
most populous city, Aleppo.
See All-Out Repression: Purging Dissent in Aleppo, Syria, Aᴍɴᴇsᴛʏ Iɴᴛ’ʟ
(2012),
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/24000/mde240612012e
n.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KXD-8R7S]. For AI’s review of 2018 events,
see Syria: Human Rights in Syria: Review of 2018, Aᴍɴᴇsᴛʏ Iɴᴛ’ʟ (Feb.
26,
2019),
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE2499032019ENG
LISH.pdf [https://perma.cc/DTD2-QBQF].

13.

See Security Council: Two Draft Resolutions, Zero Consensus on
Ceasefire
in
Syria’s
Idlib, UN News (Sept. 19, 2017),
https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/09/1046802
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a truce in Aleppo, 14 calling for the Security Council to refer Syrian
crimes to the International Criminal Court, 15 threatening Syria with
sanctions if it did not stop using heavy weapons, 16 condemning a Syrian
crackdown on the opposition, 17 and condemning Syria’s grave violations
of human rights. 18
Thus, it is not surprising that in his address to the Human Rights
Council on February 26, 2018, the then U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, noted “seven years of
unremitting and frightful mass killing” in Syria, 19 and said:
Second to those who are criminally responsible – those who kill
and those who maim – the responsibility for the continuation of
so much pain lies with the five permanent members of the U.N.
Security Council. So long as the veto is used by them to block
any unity of action, when it is needed the most, when it could
reduce the extreme suffering of innocent people, then it is they –
the permanent members – who must answer before the victims.20

[https://perma.cc/K6XA-D6V7]; Security Council Veto, supra note 1; see
also Security Council - Veto List, Dᴀɢ Hᴀᴍᴍᴀʀsᴋᴊᴏʟᴅ Lɪʙʀᴀʀʏ,
https://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/scact_veto_table_en.htm
[https://perma.cc/UR9G-S7U6] (listing records for Security Council vote
on Middle East (Syria), S/2018/321 (Apr. 10, 2018); Security Council
Vote on Middle East (Syria), S/2017/970 (Nov. 17, 2017); Security
Council Vote on Middle East (Syria), S/2017/962, (Nov. 16, 2017);
Security Council Vote on Middle East (Syria), S/2017/884 (Oct. 24,
2017); Security Council Vote on Middle East (Syria), S/2017/315 (Apr.
12, 2017); Security Council Vote on Middle East (Syria), S/2017/172
(Feb. 28, 2017)).
14.

See Security Council Vote on Syria, S/2016/1026 (Dec. 5, 2016); Security
Council Vote on Middle East (Syria), S/2016/846 (Oct. 8, 2016); Security
Council Veto, supra note 1.

15.

Security Council vote on Syria, S/2014/348 (May 22, 2014). Security
Council Veto, supra note 1.

16.

Security Council vote on Syria, S/2012/77 (Feb. 4, 2012).
Council Veto, supra note 1.

Security

17.

Security Council vote on Syria, S/2012/538 (Jul. 19, 2012).
Council Veto, supra note 1.

Security

18.

Security Council vote on Syria, S/2011/612 (Oct. 4, 2011).
Council Veto, supra note 1.

Security

19.

U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Opening Statements of the
37th Session of the Human Rights Council (Feb. 26, 2018), available at
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?News
ID=22702&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/US82-6ELN].

20.

Id.
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Praising the leadership of France and the United Kingdom for their
initiative championing a code of conduct for P5 on the use of the veto,21
he urged that it was time for China, Russia, and the United States to
join them, “for the love of mercy . . . and end the pernicious use of the
veto.” 22
To provide an appropriate context for the discussion here, Part II
briefly reviews the genesis of the veto, which is followed in Part III by
a recounting of the commitment made by world leaders at the 2005
U.N. Summit as they proclaimed their initiative entitled
“Responsibility to Protect.” 23 Part IV provides an overview of the
Uniting for Peace Resolution and the legal basis for its validity
notwithstanding the Charter prohibition on the use of force. Part V is
the Conclusion.

II.

Genesis of the Veto Right of the Five Permanent
Members of the Security Council

Under the U.N. Charter, the five permanent members of the
Security Council are entitled to a veto power. 24 Article 27 reads:
1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2.Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall
be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.
3.Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be
made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the
concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in
decisions under Chapter VI (Peaceful Settlement of Disputes),
and under paragraph 3 of article 52 (encouragement of settlement
of local disputes through regional arrangements or regional
agencies), a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. 25

This was a major shift from the decision-making process of the
League of Nations, which required the unanimous vote of all Council
members, both permanent and non-permanent. 26
21.

Id.

22.

Id.

23.

U.N. Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect,
Responsibility
to
Protect,
U.N.,
https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-toprotect.shtml [https://perma.cc/A36N-4V45].

24.

U.N. Charter art. 27.

25.

Id.

26.

See League of Nations Covenant art. 5.
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This veto power can be traced back to the decisions taken during
the San Francisco Conference convened to set up an organization which
would preserve peace and help build a better world. 27 On June 8, 1945,
the Chairman of the Technical Committee on the Structure and
Procedures of the Security Council released a “Statement by the
Delegations of the Four Sponsoring Governments,” consisting of The
United States of America, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the
Republic of China, which was subsequently subscribed by the
Delegation of France. 28
On the voting procedure of the Security Council, the statement
reads: “The Yalta voting formula substitutes for the rule of complete
unanimity of the League Council a system of qualified majority voting
in the Security Council. Under this system, non-permanent members
of the Security Council individually would have no ‘veto.’” 29 It further
states, “It is not to be assumed, however, that the permanent members
. . . would use their ‘veto’ power willfully to obstruct the operation of
the Council,” 30 obviously expressing a hope and optimism that have not
borne out as history has unfolded.
Initially, the world leaders--President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin,
and Prime Minister Churchill--who met at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944 to
chart the future of the new organization, 31 the United Nations, could
not agree on the structure of the veto. 32 As Professor Francis O.
Wilcox, who served as a consultant to the congressional members of the
American delegation at San Francisco, 33 recounts:
In respect to voting procedure, the Dumbarton Oaks conferees
could not reach complete agreement and the matter was
27.

Shaping our Future Together – 1945: The San Francisco Conference,
U.N.
https://www.un.org/en/sections/history-united-nationscharter/1945-san-francisco
conference/index.html [https://perma.cc/S8UY-G7R2].

28.

U.N. Conference on International Organization, Statement by Mr. John
Sofianopoulos, Chairman of Technical Committee III/1 on the Structure
and Procedures of the Security Council, p. 710, S.C. Commission III Vol.
11:
Structure
and
Procedures
(June
8,
1945) https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1300969?ln=en
[https://perma.cc/MF7N-2A64].

29.

Id. at 713.

30.

Id.

31.

See Francis O. Wilcox, The Yalta Voting Formula, 39 Aᴍ. Pᴏʟ. Sᴄɪ. Rᴇᴠ.
943, 944 (Oct. 1945).

32.

Id.

33.

Id. at 943.
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postponed until the Crimea Conference in February, 1945. There
President Roosevelt submitted a formula which was approved by
Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill and was later
accepted by China. This formula, in effect, reinforced the special
position of the permanent members by assuring them that the
Organization could take no important action without their joint
consent. 34

Concerned with the nature of the veto giving the permanent
members of the Security Council power and prestige with the veto,
smaller states offered several amendments to weaken their power. 35 But
the permanent members stayed firm and the Yalta formula was
approved by a vote of 30 to 2, with fifteen delegations abstaining.36
Professor Wilcox recounts:
At San Francisco, the issue was made crystal clear by the leaders
of the Big Five: it was either the Charter with the veto or no
Charter at all. Senator Connally dramatically tore up a copy of
the Charter during one of his speeches and reminded the small
states that they would be guilty of that same act if they opposed
the unanimity principle. ‘You may, if you wish,’ he said, ‘go
home from this Conference and say that you have defeated the
veto. But what will be your answer when you are asked: ‘Where
is the Charter?” 37

Over the years, permanent members have used the veto 290 times
as of August 2019. 38 After casting the first veto on a draft resolution
regarding the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and Syria on
February 16, 1946, 39 the USSR cast almost all the vetoes until 1970.40
Also, as mentioned earlier, from October 4, 2011, when the USSR
vetoed the condemnation of human rights violations by Syrian
authorities, 41 it cast every veto until November 16, 2017. 42 It was in

34.

Id. at 944.

35.

Id. at 946.

36.

Id. at 950.

37.

Wilcox, supra note 30, at 954.

38.

Security Council Veto, supra note 1.

39.

Id.

40.

Id.

41.

S.C. Vote on Syria, S/2011/24 (Oct. 4, 2011).

42.

Security Council Veto, supra note 1.
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response to the Soviet Union’s use of vetoes in the early years that the
General Assembly adopted the Uniting for Peace Resolution. 43

III. Origin and Evolution of the “Responsibility to
Protect” Principle
Secretary-General Kofi Annan initiated the process that would
culminate in the endorsement of the “Responsibility to Protect”
principle at the U.N. World Summit of Heads of State and Government
in September 2005. 44 In his Millennium Report to the General
Assembly in April 2000, the Secretary-General had called upon member
states to “unite in the pursuit of more effective policies, to stop
organized mass murder and egregious violations of human rights.”45
Responding to the severe criticism of humanitarian intervention as a
potential response to tragedies such as Rwanda and Srebrenica, he had
stated: “[I]f humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable
assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a
Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that
affect every precept of our common humanity?” 46
43.

Christian Tomuschat, Uniting for Peace, U.N. Aᴜᴅɪᴏᴠɪsᴜᴀʟ Lɪʙʀᴀʀʏ ᴏF
Iɴᴛ’ʟ L., 1 (2008), http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ufp/ufp_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C48R-JBG6].

44.

2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶139, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/1, 30 (Sept. 16, 2005) [hereinafter World Summit Outcome],
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/genera
lassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PE8N-8TEM].

45.

The Secretary-General’s Millennium Report, We the Peoples: The Role of
the United Nations in the 21st Century, 47, U.N. Doc. A54/2000 (April
3,
2000),
available
at
https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/388/97/IMG/N0038897.pdf?OpenEl
ement [https://perma.cc/U7CU-KLB8].

46.

For a discussion of humanitarian intervention, see generally SEAN D.
MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN
EVOLVING WORLD ORDER (1994); FERNANDO R. TESÓN, HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY (2d ed. 1997);
James A.R. Nafziger, Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention
in a Community of Power, 20 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 9 (1991-1992);
Ved P. Nanda, et al., Tragedies in Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda
and Liberia – Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention under
International Law – Part II, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y (1998); W.
Michael Reisman, Unilateral Action and the Transformations of the
World Constitutive Process: The Special Problem of Humanitarian
Intervention, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 3 (2000); Thomas G. Weiss, The Sunset
of Humanitarian Intervention? Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar
Era, 35 SECURITY DIALOGUE 135 (2004). Gareth Evans & Mohamed
Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect, INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (2001), available at
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Among several studies in response to the Secretary-General’s
challenge, the 2001 Report of the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), entitled “The
Responsibility to Protect,” 47 was most influential in giving shape to the
doctrine as it evolved and was endorsed by the 2005 World Summit.48
The ICISS Report shifted the debate from the “right of humanitarian
intervention” or “right to intervene,” to the “responsibility to
protect.” 49 According to the Report, the newly emerging doctrine
would comprise three distinct responsibilities: the responsibility to
prevent (with the focus on the importance of early warning mechanisms
and conflict prevention); 50 the responsibility to react (which in extreme
cases may include military intervention); 51 and the responsibility to
rebuild after military intervention. 52
The responsibility to react would apply when a state was either
unable or unwilling to protect its citizens from massive human rights
violations occurring in the state. 53 For such an intervention, the
Commission proposed a “just cause” threshold, that is, “serious and
http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf; Gareth Evans &
Mohamed Sahnoun, Intervention and State Sovereignty: Breaking New
Ground, 7 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 119, 119 (2001); Report of the Highlevel Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Gareth Evans, A More
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2,
2004); James Turner Johnson, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, AND SOVEREIGNTY: HISTORICAL AND MORAL
REFLECTIONS, 23 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV 609 (2015); Harold Hongju Koh,
Humanitarian Intervention: Time for a Better Law, 111 AJIL UNBOUND
287 (2017).
47.

See generally Report of the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, Letter dated 26 July
2002 from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/57/303, annex (Aug. 14,
2002)
[hereafter
ICISS
Report],
http://undocs.org/A/57/303
[https://perma.cc/4SAX-XQF8].

48.

Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 16 September 2005, 2005
World Summit Outcome, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1, at 30, available at
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/genera
lassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9HMG-PTTX].

49.

ICISS Report, supra note 46, § 2.29 (“[T]he responsibility to protect
implies an evaluation of the issues from the point of view of those seeking
or needing support, rather than those who may be considering
intervention.”).

50.

Id. at xi.

51.

See generally id. §§ 4.1–4.43.

52.

See generally id. §§ 5.1–5.31.

53.

Id. § 2.29.
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irreparable harm” to human beings, such as large-scale loss of life or
large-scale ethnic cleansing. 54 Once this threshold was reached, the
Commission proposed four precautionary principles to guide the use of
force: 1) right intention to “halt or avert human suffering”; 55 2) last
resort after all diplomatic and non-military avenues to prevent the
conflict or settle it with peaceful means if it has already begun; 56 3)
proportional means to secure the humanitarian objective of protecting
those needing support; 57 and 4) reasonable prospect of success in ending
the atrocities or suffering that triggered the intervention so that the
consequences of intervention are not likely to be worse than the
consequences of inaction. 58
The Report offered alternative options if the Security Council was
unable to act: an emergency special session of the General Assembly
under the “Uniting for Peace” resolution, 59 or action of regional
organizations 60 “subject to their seeking subsequent authorization from
the Security Council. . . But . . . there are recent cases when approval
has been sought ex post facto or after the event (Liberia and Sierra
Leone), and there may be leeway for future action in this regard.” 61
Addressing the veto issue, the Commission said “the Permanent
Five members of the Security Council should consider and seek to reach
agreement not to apply their veto power, in matters where their vital
state interests are not involved, to obstruct the passage of resolutions
authorizing military intervention for human protection purposes for
which there is otherwise majority support.” 62 The Report cautioned
the Security Council that if the Council were to fail to live up to its
responsibility, single states or coalitions might take action, 63 and if the
action were a success, this “may have enduringly serious consequences
for the stature and credibility of the U.N. itself.” 64
The next stage of the evolutionary process of the Responsibility to
Protect doctrine (“R2P”) was reached with the publication of the
54.

Id. §§ 4.18–4.19, §§ 4.32–4.33.

55.

ICISS Report, supra note 46, §§ 4.32–4.33.

56.

Id. § 4.37.

57.

Id. § 4.39.

58.

Id. § 4.41.

59.

Id. §§ 6.29–6.30; Uniting for Peace, G.A. Res. 377(V), U.N. Doc. A/1775
(Nov. 3, 1950).

60.

ICISS Report, supra note 46, §§ 6.31–6.35.

61.

Id. § 6.35.

62.

Id. § 8.29(2).

63.

Id. § 6.39.

64.

Id. § 6.40.
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December 2004 Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change 65 established by Secretary-General Annan. 66 Endorsing
what it called an “emerging norm,” the Panel embraced a “collective
international responsibility to protect” 67 and supported the ICISS
Report’s recommendation that the Security Council was the proper
U.N. body to authorize military intervention as a last resort “in the
event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or
serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign
Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.” 68
The panel also endorsed the “just cause” threshold recommended
in the ICISS’ Report, as well as its precautionary principles, 69 although
it renamed the basic criteria of legitimacy – seriousness of threat, proper
purpose, last resort, proper means, and balance of consequences.70
However, the Panel did not discuss any alternative to the Security
Council’s taking action, although it urged the permanent members to
refrain from “use of the veto in cases of genocide and large-scale human
rights abuses.” 71 In his March 2005 report, entitled “In Larger
Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All,”
Annan accepted the Panel’s recommendations. 72
As the final step, the 2005 World Summit considered the SecretaryGeneral’s Report and endorsed each state’s responsibility to protect its
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes
against humanity,” 73 adding that “[t]his responsibility entails the
prevention of such crimes.” 74
The Summit further resolved:

65.

High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, U.N. SecretaryGeneral, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and
Change: A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, U.N. Doc.
A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004), available at https://undocs.org/A/59/565
[https://perma.cc/GCG5-NMR7].

66.

Id. ¶ 24–25.

67.

Id. ¶ 202–03.

68.

Id. ¶ 203.

69.

Id. ¶ 207.

70.

Id.

71.

U.N. Doc. A/59/565, supra note 64, ¶ 256.

72.

U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development,
Security, and Human Rights for All, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21,
2005).

73.

World Summit Outcome, supra note 43, § 138.

74.

Id.
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The international community, through the United Nations, also
has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic,
humanitarian and other peaceful means to help to protect
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the
Security Council, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with
relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful
means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly
failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 75

In 2009, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon released a seminal report,
“Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,” 76 in which he articulated
R2P’s three-pillar framework. 77 Under Pillar One, each state has the
primary responsibility to protect its population from atrocity crimes:
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.78
Pillar Two states the wider international community’s commitment to
encourage and assist individual states to meet that responsibility.79
And Pillar Three articulates the international community’s
responsibility to take “timely and decisive” action to prevent and halt
these crimes, in accordance with the U.N. Charter when a state is
“manifestly failing” to protect its population. 80 The report provides for
the General Assembly to be proactive, as provided under Charter
articles 10-14 and under the “Uniting for Peace” resolution. 81
On September 14, 2009, recalling the 2005 World Summit Outcome,
the General Assembly adopted the resolution, 82 the Responsibility to
Protect, and decided in its operative part “to continue its consideration
of the responsibility to protect.” 83 Following this, the General
Assembly has conducted several Informal Interactive Dialogues on the

75.

Id. § 139.

76.

U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep.
of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) [hereinafter
Implementing R2P].

77.

Id. at 2.

78.

Id. at 8-9.

79.

Id. at 9.

80.

Id.

81.

Id.

82.

G.A.
Res.
63/308,
¶
2
(Oct.
7,
2009),
https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/63/308 [https://perma.cc/Z279-JJL5].

83.

Id. ¶ 1–2.
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Responsibility to Protect 84 and the Secretary-General has released
annual reports. 85 The Security Council has invoked the Responsibility
to Protect in more than 65 resolutions, 86 and the Human Rights Council
in 30 resolutions. 87
The Security Council successfully implemented R2P in situations
in Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, and Mali, 88 while it was unsuccessful in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Darfur and Blue Nile & South
Kordofan in Sudan, South Sudan, and Central African Republic.89
Unsuccessful attempts resulted from U.N. Security Council’s actual or
threatened veto in Yemen, Syria, Myanmar, and Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (North Korea). 90
As mentioned above, Russia and China have persisted in their
opposition to the Security Council’s invocation of R2P in the Syrian
context, 91 notwithstanding that the Syrian regime has been found
committing war crimes and crimes against humanity resulting in over
560,000 people killed as of December 2018. 92 One reason for the vetoes
is Russia’s and China’s opposition to regime change as part of R2P.93
They accuse the 2011 NATO operation of misusing R2P by forcing
regime change in Lybia, in addition to protecting civilians, for which
R2P was designed. 94
84.

See generally About R2P, Gʟᴏʙᴀʟ Cᴇɴᴛʀᴇ Fᴏʀ ᴛʜᴇ Rᴇsᴘᴏɴsɪʙɪʟɪᴛʏ ᴛᴏ Pʀᴏᴛᴇᴄᴛ,
www.globalr2p.org/about_r2p
[https://perma.cc/M5BQ-NLQ7]
(accounting for these developments and for several publications on the
topic).

85.

Id.

86.

Id.

87.

Id.

88.

Jared Genser, The United Nations Security Council’s Implementation of
the Responsibility to Protect: A Review of Past Interventions and
Recommendations for Improvement, 18 Cʜɪ. J. Iɴᴛ’ʟ L. 420, 434 (2018).

89.

See generally id. at 450-78.

90.

See generally id. at 478-500.

91.

Id. at 485.

92.

Syria: 560,000 killed in seven years of war, SYRIAN OBSERVATORY FOR
HUM.
RTS.
(Dec.
12,
2018),
www.syriahr.com/en/?p=108829 [https://perma.cc/3RM2-D2DB].

93.

Genser, supra note 88, at 485.

94.

See generally Jᴇɴɴᴀ Rᴜssᴏ, Tʜᴇ Pᴏʟɪᴛɪᴄs ᴏF R2P ᴀɴᴅ Iɴᴀᴄᴛɪᴏɴ ɪɴ Sʏʀɪᴀ: U.S.
Rᴜssɪᴀɴ, ᴀɴᴅ Cʜɪɴᴇsᴇ Rᴇsᴘᴏɴsᴇs (2017); Jᴇss GɪFᴋɪɴs, Tʜᴇ U.N. Sᴇᴄᴜʀɪᴛʏ
Cᴏᴜɴᴄɪʟ Dɪᴠɪᴅᴇᴅ: Sʏʀɪᴀ ɪɴ Cʀɪsɪs, 4 Gʟᴏʙᴀʟ Rᴇsᴘᴏɴsɪʙɪʟɪᴛʏ ᴛᴏ Pʀᴏᴛᴇᴄᴛ 377
(2012). See also U.N. SCOR 66 Sess., 6531st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.6531
(May 10, 2011) (Chinese and Russian delegates discussing protecting
civilians in armed conflict); id. at 9 (statement by Russia’s delegate)
(“The noble goal of protecting civilians should not be compromised by
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In Libya, the protests and demonstrations against the Muammar
Qaddafi regime began in February 2011. 95 In response to reports that
government troops had fired from aircraft at demonstrators, the U.N.
Secretary General called for an immediate end to the violence on
February 21, 2011. 96 The following day, in a statement issued by the
Security Council, the members condemned the violence and repression
against the civilians and demonstrators, and called upon the Libyan
government to “meet its responsibility to protect its population.” 97 On
February 25, the Secretary-General again responded to reports about
the regime’s use of detention and torture of the opposition, shooting of
peaceful demonstrators, and indiscriminate killing by calling upon the
Security Council to take concrete action in Libya. 98
Alarmed at the reports of serious violations of human rights in
Libya, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay,
denounced “the use of live ammunition against peaceful protesters in
attempts to resolve in parallel any unrelated issues. In that regard, we
share the concern expressed by Ms. Amos with regard to the situation in
Libya. The statement by a representative of the coalition with regard to
resolution 1973 (2011) is not in line with the reality.”). Ms. Amos,
delegate of Brazil, had said that the use of force in Libya raised concerns
“in terms of the potential undermining of the protection of civilians
agenda.” Id. at 4; id. at 20 (statement by China’s delegate) (“There must
be no attempt at regime change or involvement in civil war by any party
under the guise of protecting civilians.”).
95.

Kareem Fahim & David D. Kirkpatrick, Qaddafi’s Grip on the Capital
Tightens as Revolt Grows, N.Y. Tɪᴍᴇs (Feb. 22, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/world/africa/23libya.html
[perma.cc/9RPN-VHQX].

96.

Press Release, Secretary-General, Outraged Secretary-General Calls for
Immediate End to Violence in Libya, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/13408
(Feb.
22,
2011),
available
at
https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sgsm13408.doc.htm [perma.cc/29A85K5W].

97.

Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on
Libya, U.N. Press Release SC/10180 (Feb. 22, 2011), available at
https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10180.doc.htm [perma.cc/K8QLS4QW].

98.

Press Release, Security Council, Fundamental Issues of Peace, Security at
State, Secretary-General Warns as he Briefs Security Council on Situation
in Libya, U.N. Press Release, SC/10185 (Feb. 25, 2011), available at
https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10185.doc.htm
[perma.cc/9SUJAKWL]. See also Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General
Tells Security Council Time to Consider Concrete Action in Libya, as
Loss of Time Means More Loss of Lives, U.N. Press Release
SG/SM/13418-SC/10186 (Feb.
25,
2011),
available
at
https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sgsm13418.doc.htm
[https://perma.cc/AQH2-PN94].
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Libya,” 99 and called for an international inquiry into the violence. 100 A
group of U.N. human rights experts warned that the government of
Libya’s gross violation of human rights could amount to crimes against
humanity. 101
The U.N. Human Rights Council also strongly condemned the
“gross and systematic human rights violations committed in Libya,
including indiscriminate armed attacks against civilians, extrajudicial
killings, arbitrary arrests, detention and torture of peaceful
demonstrators, some of which may also amount to crimes against
humanity” 102 in a resolution it adopted on February 25, 2011. 103 Under
the resolution, the Council established an Independent International
Commission of Inquiry to investigate the alleged violations, and
requested the Commission “to establish the facts and circumstances of
such violations and of the crimes perpetrated and, where possible to
identify those responsible [so that] those individuals responsible are held
accountable.” 104
As the repression continued, the Arab League, the African Union,
and the Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference condemned Libya’s the violation of human rights and
international human rights law. 105 The Security Council welcomed this
development and recalled the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to
protect the population in the preamble of Resolution 1970 of February
26, 2011. 106 In its operative parts, the resolution demanded “an
99.

U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Pillay Denounces
Violence by Security Forces in Middle East and North Africa, U.N. NEWS
(Feb. 18, 2011), https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/02/367032-unrights-chief-condemns-violence-against-protesters-middle-east-northafrica [perma.cc/NJ2H-S7SV].

100. Press Release, Pillay Calls for International Inquiry into Libyan Violence
and Justice for Victims, U.N. Press Release (Feb. 22, 2011), available at
https://newsarchive.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.asp
x?NewsID=10743&LangID=E [perma.cc/294S-KMM4].
101. Press Release, Human Rights Council, “Stop the Massacre” – U.N.
Experts
(Feb.
22,
2011),
available
at https://newsarchive.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.as
px?NewsID=10747&LangID=E [perma.cc/TD3P-AQ99].
102. Press Release, Human Rights Council, Human Rights Council Passes
Resolution on Libya in Special Session (Feb. 25, 2011), available
at https://newsarchive.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.
aspx?NewsID=10768&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/9ULB-2VP3].
103. Human Rights Council, Res. 15/1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S-15/1 (Feb. 25,
2011).
104. Id. ¶ 11.
105. S.C. Res. 1970, 1 (Feb. 26, 2011).
106. Id. at 2.
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immediate end to the violence,” 107 decided to refer the Libyan situation
to the International Criminal Court, 108 and imposed sanctions against
Libya, including an arms embargo, 109 travel ban against named
government officials, 110 and an asset freeze. 111
The repression continued and the Libyan government remained
defiant. During March, among several organizations calling for the
Security Council and other appropriate international bodies to protect
the civilian population in Libya was the African Commission on Human
and Peoples’ Rights. 112 Other calls to protect civilians from airstrikes
and thus to impose a no-fly zone over Libya, came from the SecretaryGeneral of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, 113 the European
Parliament, 114 and several Arab Gulf countries. 115 On March 14, 2011,
the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United
Nations addressed a letter to the President of the U.N. Security
Council, informing him about the Council of the League’s decision “[t]o
call upon the Security Council, in view of the deterioration in the
situation in Libya, to shoulder its responsibility and take the measures
necessary to immediately impose a no-fly zone on Libyan military
aircraft . . . .” 116
On March 17, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973
authorizing member states to take all necessary measures to protect
civilians in Libya. 117 It reiterated the Libyan authorities’ responsibility
to protect the Libyan population 118 and reaffirmed the primary
responsibility of the parties to armed conflicts “to take all feasible steps
107. Id. ¶ 1.
108. Id. ¶ 4.
109. Id. ¶ 9.
110. Id. ¶¶ 15-16, Annex I.
111. S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 105, ¶¶ 17-22, Annex II.
112. AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, RESOLUTION ON
THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN THE GREAT SOCIALIST PEOPLES’ LIBYAN
ARAB JAMAHIRIYA (2011).
113. Abdul Nabi Shaheen, OIC plans to support no-fly zone over Libya, GULF
NEWS WORLD (March 16, 2011), https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/oicplans-to-support-no-fly-zone-over-libya-1.778130
[https://perma.cc/V7UT-5KM4].
114. 2011 O.J. (C119) 158.
115. Kareem Shaheen, GCC Wants No-Fly Zone Over Libya, Tʜᴇ Nᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ
(Mar. 8, 2011), https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/gcc-wantsno-fly-zone-over-libya-1.414985 [perma.cc/R7DU-XD5B].
116. U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/2011/137 (Mar. 15, 2011).
117. S.C. Res. 1973 ¶ 4 (Mar. 17, 2011).
118. Id. at 1.
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to ensure the protection of civilians.” 119 Following several months of
military operations by NATO, the Qadaffi regime fell, ending his 42year rule, and he was captured and killed by rebels. 120
As mentioned above, in the early years, the U.S.S.R. cast almost
all the vetoes in the Security Council. 121 As I will discuss next, its
vetoes on the Korean situation led to the adoption of the Uniting for
Peace resolution. 122 Now that Russia has again similarly blocked any
Security Council action against the Syrian regime, 123 the question is
pertinent: why not again deploy the Uniting for Peace mechanism to
unblock the Security Council? 124

IV. Overview of the Uniting for Peace Resolution and
History of UFP Application
The Uniting for Peace Resolution was adopted following U.S.S.R.
vetoes of the draft resolution of the United States on the “Complaint
of Aggression” against the Republic of North Korea, September 5,
1950, 125 and its veto on September 12, 1950 of another draft resolution
related to the Korean War. 126 At the September 1950 session of the
General Assembly, the U.S. delegation requested that the Assembly
consider making recommendations in case of any breach of international
119. Id.
120. Kareem Fahim, et al., Violent End to an Era as Qaddafi Dies in Libya,
TIMES
(Oct.
20,
2011),
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/world/africa/qaddafi-is-killed-aslibyan-forces-take-surt.html [perma.cc/6MSC-QWSR].
121. Security Council Veto, supra note 2.
122. Andrew J. Carswell, Unblocking the UN Security Council: The Uniting
for Peace Resolution, 18 J. ᴏF CᴏɴFʟɪᴄᴛ & Sᴇᴄᴜʀɪᴛʏ L. 453, 457–459 (2013).
123. See id. at 454–56.
124. See Yasmine Nahalwi, Overcoming Russian and Chinese Vetoes on Syria
Through Uniting for Peace, 24 J. CᴏɴFʟɪᴄᴛ & Sᴇᴄᴜʀɪᴛʏ L. 111 (2019);
Andrew Carswell, Unblocking the UN Security Council: The Uniting for
Peace Resolution, 18 J. CᴏɴFʟɪᴄᴛ & Sᴇᴄᴜʀɪᴛʏ L. 453 (2013); Asian Udoh,
Case Study: Invoking the ‘Uniting for Peace’ Resolution of 1950 to
Authorize the Use of Humanitarian Military Intervention and Prevent
Mass Atrocities in Syria, 23 Wɪʟʟᴀᴍᴇᴛᴛᴇ J. Iɴᴛ’ʟ L. & Dɪs. Rᴇs. 187 (2015)
125. See generally U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 496th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/PV.496
(Sept. 5, 1950) (containing the draft U.S. Resolution S/1653). The result
of the vote was nine in favor, the U.S.S.R. against, and Yugoslavia
abstaining. Id. at 18-19.
126. See U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 501st mtg. U.N. Doc. S/PV.501 (Sept. 12,
1950) (containing the draft U.S. Resolution S/1745/Rev.1). The vote was
seven votes to one with two abstentions, India and Yugoslavia, and one
member, China not participating in the vote. Id. at 13.
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peace or act of aggression if the Security Council is unable to discharge
its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security because of the lack of unanimity of the permanent
members. 127 After deliberations and objections by the Soviet Union,
the General Assembly adopted Resolution 377A (V), “Uniting for
Peace,” by a vote of 55 to 5, on November 3, 1950.128
Reaffirming “the duty of the permanent members to seek
unanimity and to exercise restraint in the use of the veto,” the
core of the resolution, Part A, reads: The General Assembly
Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity
of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the
peace, breach of the pea, or act of aggression, the General
Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to
making appropriate recommendations to members for collective
measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of
aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or
restore international peace and security. If not in session at the
time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special
session within twenty-four hours of the request therefor. Such
emergency special session shall be called if requested by the
Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a
majority of the Members of the United Nations . . . . 129

All the provisions embodied in this resolution have their source in
the U.N. Charter. First, under aArticle 20, Special Sessions of the
General Assembly “shall be convoked by the Secretary-General at the
request of the Security Council or of a majority of the Members of the
United Nations.” 130 Article 27(2) states that the Security Council’s
decisions “on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote
of nine members” without the right to veto, 131 contrasted with article
27(3), under which the Security Council’s decision on non-procedural
matters “shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members
including the concurring votes of the permanent members.” 132

127. See id.
128. G.A. Res. 377 (V), at 10 (Nov. 3, 1950).
129. Id.
130. U.N. Charter, art. 20.
131. U.N. Charter art. 27, ¶ 2.
132. U.N. Charter art. 27, ¶ 3.
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While the controversy arises about the General Assembly’s
recommendation to “the use of armed force,” 133 its authority to make
recommendations for non-coercive measures is not controversial.134
Under article 24, the Security Council has “primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and security,” 135 which is not
exclusive and leaves the General Assembly with secondary
responsibility. 136
To appreciate the roles of the Security Council and the General
Assembly related to the maintenance of international peace and
security, Articles 11 and 12 provide the pertinent information. Article
12 states that “[w]hile the Security Council is exercising in respect of
any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present
Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation
with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so
requests.” 137
Article 11 provides for the Assembly to make
recommendations on questions relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security “except as provided in Article 12.” 138
133. See John W. Halderman, Legal Basis for United Nations Armed Forces,
56 Aᴍ. J. ᴏF Iɴᴛ’ʟ L. 971, 971–96 (1962).
134. See generally Hans Kelsen, Is the Acheson Plan Constitutional?, 3
Wᴇsᴛᴇʀɴ Pᴏʟ. Q. 512, 512–27 (1950).
135. U.N. Charter art. 24 ¶ 1 (“In order to ensure prompt and effective action
by the United Nations, its members confer on the Security Council
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility
the Security Council acts on their behalf.”).
136. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I962 I.C.J.
163 (July 20) (“The responsibility conferred [on the Security Council] is
‘primary,’ not exclusive. . . . The Charter makes it abundantly clear,
however, that the General Assembly is also to be concerned with
international peace and security. Article 14 authorizes the General
Assembly to ‘recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any
situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general
welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting
from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter, setting forth the
purposes and principles of the United Nations.’ The word ‘measures’
implies some kind of action, and the only limitation which Article 14
imposes on the General Assembly is the restriction found in Article 12,
namely, that the Assembly should not recommend measures while the
Security Council is dealing with the same matter, unless the Council
requests it to do so.”).
137. Id.
138. U.N. Charter art. 11, ¶ 2 (“The General Assembly may discuss any
questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security
brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security
Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations . . .
. and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with
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Thus, under articles 11 and 12, the General Assembly can make
recommendations even when the Security Council is seized by peace
and security issues. 139 The validity of this construction of Articles 11
and 12 is affirmed by the International Court of Justice’s advisory
opinion in Construction of a Wall Case 140 by interpreting Article 12 as
it has evolved. The Court said:
As regards the practice of the United Nations, both the General
Assembly and the Security Council initially interpreted and
applied Article 12 to the effect that the Assembly could not make
a recommendation on a question concerning the maintenance of
international peace and security while the matter remained on
the Council’s agenda. . . . However, this interpretation of Article
12 has evolved subsequently. . . . Indeed, the Court notes that
there has been an increasing tendency over time for the General
Assembly to deal in parallel with the same matter concerning the
maintenance of international peace and security . . . . It is often
the case that, while the Security Council has tended to focus on
the aspects of such matters related to international peace and
security, the General Assembly has taken a broader view,
considering also their humanitarian, social and economic
aspects. 141

The major hurdle for the Uniting for Peace resolution is the
statement that the General Assembly may make “appropriate
recommendations to Members for collective measures, including . . . the
use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international
peace and security,” 142 for the Charter Article 2, paragraph 4 prohibits
“the threat or use of force” by U.N. members. 143 This principle may

regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the
Security Council or to both. Any such question on which action is
necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General
Assembly either before or after discussion.”).
139. U.N. Charter art. 11, ¶¶ 2, 3–12.
140. See generally Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 138 (July
9).
141. Id. at 149-50, ¶ 27.
142. GA Res. 377, supra note 128.
143. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations.”).
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even have acquired the status of jus cogens.144 Judge Elaraby states in
his separate opinion that Article 2(4) “is universally recognized as a jus
cogens principle, a peremptory norm from which no derogation is
permitted.” 145
Andrew Carswell, however, argues that the Article 2(4)
“prohibition binds ‘Members’ as such and not the Organization.” 146 He
adds,
the actions of UN members, pursued within the scope of a General
Assembly recommendation to use force, will be subsumed within
the authority of the UN Organization in cases where an effective
delegation of authority has taken place, and will not therefore be
captured by the article 2(4) prohibition on the threat or use of
force. 147

Thus, the General Assembly recommendations do not fall under
Article 2(4).
Carswell makes this assertion by contending that, as the Council’s
authorization to use force under Chapter VII exists separately and not
under Article 2(4), 148 the General Assembly is also entitled to pass “a
substantive resolution recommending the use of force by willing UN
members.” 149 He argues that this is so because the Assembly, just like
the Council, acts on behalf of the United Nations in exercising its
secondary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security. 150
It is a valid criticism of Carswell’s position, however, that any
regional or international organization could justify its authorization of
the use of force, which is against the spirit of the U.N. Charter.151
Yasmine Nahlawi suggests that the Charter authorization to use force
under Articles 51 (self-defense) and 42 (authorization by the Security
Council under Chapter VII) “are not directly linked to Article 2(4).”152
144. Jus
cogens,
Wᴇx,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/jus_cogens
[perma.cc/M5VN-BKVP].
145. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
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She asserts that, while these rules are not spelled out within the
Charter, “they have been identified [instead] through an integrated
reading of the Charter, whereby all of the rules pertaining to the use of
force have been connected to each other to yield the currently accepted
framework.” 153
It is on this ground that Nahlawi finds the General Assembly’s right
to recommend the use of force as provided by the Uniting for Peace to
be “fully consistent with Article 2(4).” 154 She adds that, along with
being lawful, it would enjoy a high degree of legitimacy, as well, because
1) it “requires a high threshold for invocation;” 155 2) the Assembly’s
recommendation “would likely specify a clear purpose as well as defined
limitations for the use of force;” 156 and 3) as the Uniting for Peace
procedure has been employed only eleven times, this “highlights that
its invocation has been confined to the most exceptional situations in
which the UNSC was paralyzed from acting, and that it has not
otherwise created a substantial challenge to legitimate uses of the veto
or to the UNSC’s primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security.” 157

V. Conclusion
This article has studied the background and legal bases for the
Responsibility to Protect doctrine and the Uniting for Peace resolution.
Since the successful implementation of the Responsibility to Protect in
Libya, the Russian and Chinese opposition has been based on their
criticism that NATO misused the doctrine by aiming the use of force
at regime change, for which the doctrine was not designed.
Just like the Responsibility to Protect, the Uniting for Peace has
also been used with recommendation on the use of force just once – in
the Korean situation on February 1, 1951. 158 Even this recommendation
was largely symbolic, although it did employ language from the Uniting
for Peace: “noting that the Security Council, because of lack of
unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to exercise its primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security
with regard to Chinese Communist intervention in Korea, . . .” 159 While
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476–77.
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the resolution exhorted member states to continue supporting the U.N.
troops in Korea, 160 many nations were reluctant to take more forceful
action against the People’s Republic of China, fearing that the conflict
in Korea would escalate. 161
None of the other eleven uses of Uniting for Peace was a
recommendation for the use of force. 162 The Security Council has not
referred any case since 1982, 163 nor has the General Assembly made any
recommendation since 1997. 164
None of the thirteen resolutions vetoed by Russia on the situation
in Syria could have led to military intervention and regime change, the
outcome opposed by Russia and the basis of its vetoes. 165 In all the
cases vetoed by Russia, Uniting for Peace process could have been
invoked. To illustrate, the most recent draft resolution sought a
ceasefire in Idlib. 166 The contents of the other twelve resolutions reveal
that six of them sought to address chemical weapons use in the Syrian
conflict, three to introduce general measures, one addressed
accountability, and two sought to protect civilians. 167
It is high time that the Uniting for Peace mechanism be used to
protect innocent men, women, and children from atrocity crimes.
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